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There is considerable interest in how policies originating in one time or place are 
adopted in other places and times. Explanations of this phenomenon have been 
dominated by three approaches: policy diffusion, policy convergence and policy 
transfer. This article demonstrates that each approach has both strengths and 
weaknesses, and no approach can, on its own, does adequate explanatory justice 
to the complexity of policy transfer from rich to poor countries. The article uses 
the case of the transfer of telecommunications privatisation policy to Thailand to 
show this complexity and focuses on the Telephone Organisation of Thailand 
(TOT). The case is presented to support the argument that the interaction of 
domestic and international actors among the unique structural features and 
historical events of a particular place result in the modification of policies as they 
move between countries and after they have arrived at their new destination. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
There has been considerable interest in how policies originating in one place 
or time are adopted in another context.  A multitude of terms have been 
employed to describe and explain this phenomenon. For example, Stone 
(1999, 2003) provides a lengthy list of terms, including lesson-drawing, 
policy bandwagoning, policy borrowing, policy shopping, systematically 
pinching ideas, penetration, external inducement, authoritarian imposition 
and policy pusher. Despite the terminological abundance, three approaches 
appear to dominate the literature—policy transfer, policy diffusion and 
policy convergence. Each of these terms captures the notion that policies 
move from one domain to another, yet each involves a different theoretical 
orientation and empirical concern. Ideally, each approach can be placed at 
different points on a continuum where agency is located at one extreme and 
structure at the other. In practise, there may be an overlap depending on 
variations in the definitions of the concepts used by different authors. The 
policy transfer approach is situated at the agency end of the continuum 
where actors make their own history. Policy convergence is located at the 
structure end, where events and environmental forces determine policy 
adoption. Policy diffusion lies in between the two but it is closer to the 
structure end. 
 Although these approaches have very different emphases, they share a 
common problem. Each pays scant attention to what happens when a policy 
enters a new domain. Is it simply adopted in its entirety? While experience 
suggests that this is often far from the case, there has been remarkably little 
attention paid to modifications that occur to policies when applied in new 
destinations and, more importantly, the process by which these 
modifications occur. This attention deficit is particularly acute for policies 
that are transferred from rich to poor countries. Recently, there has been 
interest in 'policy transferability' from rich countries to a range of 
developing countries (McCourt & Foon 2007; Evans 2004; Larmour 2005). 
However, while most of the literature notes that policies are differentially 
adopted in developing countries—for example, New Public Management in 
developing countries (Common 1998; Manning 2001; Polidano 2001; 
Turner 2002)—scholars rarely engage in detailed analyses of the processes 
or structural conditions that lead to such differential adoption.  
 This article seeks to address this understudied aspect of policy 
transfer through a case study focusing on the privatisation of 
telecommunications in Thailand. This case is used to support the argument 
that the interactions of domestic and international actors in relevant policy 
networks in combination with the unique structural features and historical 
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events of individual countries result in the modification of policies as they 
are transferred from one country to another. Thus, we must simultaneously 
consider both structure and agency when trying to explain policy transfer. 
 
 
POLICY TRANSFER, POLICY DIFFUSION AND  
POLICY CONVERGENCE 
 
In recent years, the concept of policy transfer has enjoyed the greatest 
popularity in explanations of how policies move from one jurisdiction to 
another, particularly in the field of public sector management (Common 
2001; Dolowitz & Marsh 1996, 1998; Evans & Davies 1999; Evans 2004; 
Rose 1993). In broad terms, policy transfer can be defined as the process by 
which actors use policies developed in one setting to produce programs and 
policies within another (Dolowitz & Marsh 1996). This approach involves 
the idea of intention, with actors making calculated decisions to transfer 
particular policies. These may be domestic actors who voluntarily choose to 
adopt a policy from another domain; international actors who coercively 
force domestic actors to accept a policy from elsewhere; or there may be 
elements of both voluntary and coercive transfer (Dolowitz & Marsh 1998). 
The latter type may also approximate what Common (2001) refers to as 
'perceptual transfer', wherein domestic actors perceive policy inadequacy 
and adopt a solution that has already been internationally defined and agreed 
upon, thus creating increasing pressure to conform. 
 One of the potential problems of the policy transfer approach is that it 
has a tendency 'to treat policy transfer as a discrete process, confining 
analysis to the specific actors involved without providing any description of 
the wider context' (Chulajata 2006: 18). Also, the policy transfer approach 
often seems to assume a one-way traffic from rich to poor countries, with 
the latter sometimes meekly accepting the new policy, at times willingly or, 
in many instances, under threat of sanctions such as with Structural 
Adjustment Loans (SALs). Another problem is that the perceptions of 
policy actors may be treated as if they are uniform. Thus, transferred policy 
ideas can be portrayed 'as if there were a single objective understanding of 
them' (Nakano 2004: 170). In reality, this is seldom the case, as stakeholders 
in the policy process ascribe different meanings to the items being 
transferred and, as a result, produce different policy responses (Holzinger & 
Knill 2005). Other criticisms have included the allegedly a historical nature 
of policy transfer (Stone 1999) and the fact that the 'breadth of the concept 
makes it difficult to disentangle from many other processes of policy-
making' (James & Lodge 2003: 183). Nevertheless, the various iterations of 
35 
IJAPS, Vol. 5, No. 1 (January 2009)                                      Issariyaporn Chulajata & Mark Turner 
the Dolowitz and Marsh (1996, 1998, 2000) model of policy transfer have 
made this approach a popular vehicle for dealing with the movement of 
policies between different jurisdictions and/or times. This is perhaps due to 
its user-friendliness rather than its capacity to account for the complexities 
encountered when examining actual or alleged instances of policy transfer. 
 Some of these difficulties are addressed in the policy diffusion 
approach in which 'an innovation is communicated through certain channels 
over time among members of a social system' (Rogers 1995: 5). There is an 
implication of incremental changes with 'ideas or practices spreading, 
dispersing and disseminating from a common source or point of origin' 
(Chulajata 2006: 20). An evolving 'consensual knowledge' gradually seeps 
into the consciousness of policy-makers and other influential actors, leading 
to common definitions and answers to policy problems. The growing trend 
towards international cooperation and interrelationships, often subsumed 
under the overarching concept of globalisation, seems to give additional 
weight to this interpretation of policy movement, although Holzinger and 
Knill (2005: 792) argue that 'one should not expect a general increase in 
cross-national policy convergence—not even in the era of globalisation'. 
 While the diffusionists may admit some consideration of developing 
country actors making their own history, policy convergence, in its original 
formulation, focuses on giving the adoption of rich country policies by 
developing country governments an air of inevitability. The concept of 
policy convergence has a long history, which Kerr (1983: 3) describes as 
'the tendency of societies to grow more alike, to develop similarities in 
structures, processes and performances'. It was originally 'associated with 
the range of social and economic forces produced by industrialism' (Bennett 
1991: 215), but it was also central to modernisation theory which, in the 
1960s, predicted that developing societies were on track to reproduce the 
economic, political and social systems of the 'advanced' societies (Moore 
1963). The modernisation process would facilitate the convergence of 
developing countries on a specific model of capitalist liberal democratic 
development. There has also been more recent interest in the idea of 
convergence in relation to public sector management whereby the 
innovations in certain Western countries to produce post-bureaucratic 
organisational forms based on market principles will be adopted elsewhere 
(Osborne & Gaebler 1992; Kettl 2000). Such 'mimetic isomorphism' derives 
from convergence towards 'demonstrably superior' or preferred models of 
public sector management and the fading away of old models in some sort 
of 'naturally' occurring (rather than calculative) process (Powell & 
DiMaggio 1991; Oliver 1991; Pollitt 2001). 
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 Both policy diffusion and policy convergence can be criticised for not 
paying enough attention to the actors who are involved in taking policies 
from one place to another, although Bennett's (1991) early review of the 
field does include processes suggestive of the policy transfer approach—
emulation and elite networking and policy communities. They can appear 
detached from the power struggles between actors involved in promoting or 
opposing the spread of policy innovations; people do not seem to be 
involved in making their own histories. However, as Van Waarden (1995) 
has indicated, foreign models are likely to be changed to fit national 
institutional structures and policy styles. Some political science literature 
takes this a step further, claiming that some developing country leaders have 
proved adept at outwitting rich countries and International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) (Bonner 1987; Bayart 1991; O'Brien 1991). Such 
observations indicate that the policy transfer approach may be insufficient 
on its own to deal with the complexities of policy adoption and 
implementation in the developing countries. The policy transfer approach 
requires extension to examine the interactions that occur among 
stakeholders, especially domestic ones, during transfer and supplementation 
from the diffusion and convergence approaches, which look primarily to 
structure for explanation. Such amalgamation of approaches has been 
advocated by some authors (Stone 1999; Evans & Davies 1999). This is the 
method pursued in this study and leads to the following proposition: policy 
is transferred by actors in policy networks, and their interactions will vary 
between jurisdictions, leading to different policy characteristics, but their 
interactions are located in specific and changing contexts and events that 
will influence the possibilities and choices open to the policy actors. 
 
 
PRIVATISATION AND POLICY TRANSFER 
 
For more than two decades, there has been considerable interest and action 
in transferring policies involving public sector reform from rich countries to 
poor countries. The results have been mixed, but the enthusiasm remains 
(UNDP 2005; World Bank 2000; Polidano 1999; Minogue 2001; Common 
1998, 2001). Some reform initiatives have derived from the New Public 
Management philosophy, and others from a global fascination with the 
possibilities offered by information technology and an international 
movement for territorial decentralisation. One major public service reform 
that has been transferred to most developing countries has been the 
privatisation of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). While examples of 
privatisation can be traced back to at least the 1940s, its recent popularity is 
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generally understood to commence with the initiatives of  British Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher, who was elected into office in 1979 (Hemming 
& Mansoor 1988; Megginson & Netter 2003). Her extensive privatising 
reforms provided the catalyst for privatisation policies to spread out across 
the globe. Privatisation attracted the attention of many governments, private 
sector organisations and international agencies, with the result that since the 
early 1990s, there has been a privatisation boom across the developing 
world (Kirkpatrick 2002). Industries and services previously run by the state 
have increasingly been handed over to the private sector as the state is rolled 
back to focus on its core functions. Bureaucrats, it is argued, should not be 
in business (World Bank 1995). 
 There is no common agreement on a definition of privatisation 
(Wettenhall 2006; Cook et al. 2006). At first, the term referred to the 
denationalisation or selling off of SOEs, but over time, a range of other 
initiatives have also been identified as privatisation. The choice of initiatives 
to be labelled 'privatisation' varies somewhat between authors, organisations 
and countries. We prefer to adopt a broad view that incorporates the 
following: a range of actions that can be taken to sell off state assets; 
contracting out to the private sector; various cooperative arrangements 
between the state and private sector; deregulation and liberalisation to 
facilitate private sector competition with government enterprises; leasing 
government assets to private operators; and corporatisation. This coincides 
with the contemporary official definition of privatisation in Thailand: 
 
Any measures that increase private sector participation in sectors where 
Government enterprises presently operate, including divestiture of state 
owned enterprises or assets (ownership transfer), concession 
arrangements, joint ventures, management contracts, leasing, outsourcing, 
contracting services, deregulation which increases competition, creation of 
needed regulatory bodies, and introduction of new competition (Ministry 
of Finance 1998). 
 
What all of these initiatives have in common is the participation of 
the private sector in activities formerly carried out and often monopolised 
by the government. It is also possible that the great variation in privatisation 
practise reflects the modification of policies emanating from one place when 
those policies reach foreign shores. This point will be demonstrated in the 
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THE PRIVATISATION OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
ORGANIZATION OF THAILAND 
 
The Telephone Organization of Thailand (TOT) was established in 1954 as 
a SOEs with responsibilities for the installation and delivery of telephone 
and telephone-related services (Prud'homme 2000). It was a major 
component of the state's monopoly of telecommunications services. In the 
1960s, the TOT engineered significant growth in the number of fixed 
telephone lines in Thailand, extended the geographical spread of the 
telephony system, imported new technologies and commenced integration 
into emerging international satellite systems. While the 1960s, also saw the 
Thai government begin to shift its emphasis from reliance on SOEs for 
economic growth and infrastructure development to award the private sector 
an increasingly important role, there were no plans for telecommunications 
privatisation. The government signalled its intention to privatise poorly 
performing SOEs, but the statement of intent was not reflected in 
implementation (Dempsey 2000). The state was still organised as a 
'bureaucratic polity' in which the bureaucracy dominated decision-making in 
the state and provided a barren environment for the spread of such ideas let 
alone their practise (Riggs 1966). 
 The rate of telecommunications expansion and technological 
innovation continued to increase in the 1970s, leading the government to 
establish the Communication Authority of Thailand (CAT) with 
responsibilities for international telephone services, facsimile operations and 
postal services (Brooker Group 2002: 48). This state duopoly of CAT and 
TOT effectively controlled all telecommunications in Thailand. There was 
no private sector participation. 
 At the start of the 1980s, Thailand could still be described as a 
'bureaucratic polity' in which military leaders and high-ranking public 
servants exercised sway over policy-making (Riggs 1966). However, this 
political order and relative autonomy of the state came under challenge 
during the 1980s, as rapid and sustained economic growth led to the 
emergence of a wealthier and increasingly assertive national bourgeoisie 
and a growing middle class (Laothamatas 1992; Hewison 1992). 
Furthermore, the cabinet took on a more 'civilian and less bureaucratic' 
character while the 'financial rewards for politicians had grown by leaps and 
bounds' (Milne 1992: 10). Policy-making was becoming more contested, 
involving more actors. These domestic political changes coincided with two 
other more structural developments. Firstly, the IFIs discovered 
privatisation in the mid-1980s and began to promote the practise in 
developing countries with the backing of powerful bilateral allies such as 
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the USA and UK (Galal 1991). It became one of the policy instruments of 
the Washington Consensus, the package of liberalising economic reforms 
for growth that was so vigorously promoted across the globe (Williamson 
1990, 1993). By 1984, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) had integrated 
privatisation as a goal in its operational strategies and assistance plans 
(ADB 2001). Secondly, in the telecommunications sector, Thailand's 
impressive economic growth led to a booming demand for telephone 
services. The TOT could not meet this demand and, with support from the 
private sector, introduced the 'uniquely Thai solution' of Build-Transfer-
Operate (BTO) contracts (Chulajata 2006: 192). These contracts enabled 
private companies to enter the Thai telecommunications market as partners 
(rather than contractors) of the monopoly SOEs by building and exclusively 
operating telecommunications networks over a lengthy period of time. The 
immediate transfer of the assets once construction had been completed back 
to the state under the BTO arrangement was to circumvent legal restrictions 
on private sector telecommunications ownership. While private sector 
companies eagerly took advantage of the market openings, the TOT viewed 
the BTO concessions as a temporary solution to a shortage of state funding 
for telecommunications infrastructure and services rather than a significant 
step along the road to privatisation (Painter & Wong 2005). After all, the 
public enterprise sector in Thailand, including the TOT, had remitted more 
funds to the government than it had received in the period from 1983 to 
1988 (Galal 1991). This meant that there was no financial pressure to divest 
the TOT or other leading SOEs. Furthermore, SOE workers were organised 
and opposed to privatisation and, because of Thailand's outstanding 
economic growth record many political leaders, saw 'the need to reform the 
SOEs as less pressing' (Dempsey 2000: 376). 
 The engagement of the private sector can be seen as a method of 
meeting the huge cost of infrastructure expansion generated by booming 
demand. In retrospect, the BTO concessions can be perceived as the first 
move towards telecommunications privatisation and were representative of 
an ideological shift in favour of privatisation under the government of 
Chatichai (1986–1991). However, TOT still maintained monopoly rights 
and powers in the domestic telephony market. Ironically, while the BTO 
concessions were a first step towards privatisation, the complex legal 
framework of conditions, rights and restrictions was at odds with the 
competitive market envisaged by the advocates of economic liberalisation 
(Telephone Organisation of Thailand 1992, 1993). 
 The 1990s saw an increase in pro-privatisation sentiments and actions 
in Thailand. The technocrats in the bureaucracy ensured that the Seventh 
National Economic and Social Development Plan (NESDP) indicated 
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greater commitment to deregulation and privatisation. This was in line with 
the government philosophy, although the 'noncohesive nature of the 
coalition' ensured that no specific interest dominated. International actors 
were by now providing impetus to the promotion of privatisation, especially 
in association with their technocratic allies in the Thai bureaucracy 
(Schmidt 1996). Thus, the government perceived the need to conform to the 
liberalising requirements of the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
and to go along with the IFIs' prescriptions for economic growth led by the 
private sector. Thus, ADB funded three technical assistance packages for 
privatisation in 1992–1993, including one for Telecommunications 
Restructuring and Privatisation. The Thai government voluntarily accepted 
the policy transfer of these international actors as they aligned with                
the government's own desire to have improved and expanded 
telecommunications services as integral components of national 
development. Other actors were more circumspect about the privatisation. 
These included nationalist politicians, the public, some academics and 
journalists, and, most importantly, the TOT's employees. They worried 
about a range of issues, including job security, the potential for growing 
inequity in access to services, and loss of national assets to foreign 
investors. To allay these fears, the former Ministry of Transport and 
Communications (MOTC), the parent ministry of the TOT and CAT, 
organised a symposium in 1993 to report on a CAT-TOT working group on 
privatisation. Representatives from international telecommunications SOEs 
and telecommunications regulatory organisations joined the CAT-TOT team 
to explain the benefits of privatisation. This was followed by a consultancy 
study commissioned by the TOT in 1994 from mainly international firms—
Coopers and Lybrand, Merrill Lynch, Skadden Arps, Slate Meagher and 
Flom and TISCO—to examine future telecommunications liberalisation and 
propose appropriate privatisation strategies. The ensuing report argued in 
favour of corporatising the TOT en route to floating its shares on the stock 
exchange, finally leading to the TOT's transformation into a public 
company—full privatisation (Telephone Organisation of Thailand 2005). 
 By the mid-1990s, the advocates of TOT privatisation also included a 
group of mostly domestic private sector companies that had secured 
lucrative contracts with the TOT and had developed connections with 
political parties. These included the M-group, the Jasmine Group, the 
Loxley Group, the Samart group, the Shin (Shinawatra) Group, the Telecom 
Asia (TA) Group, the TT&T Group and the UCOM Group (Chulajata 
2006). Multinational telecommunications companies also added their weight 
to the pro-privatisation lobby, seeing opportunities for themselves in a more 
liberalised Thai telecommunications sector. 
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 The Steering Committees of the TOT, CAT and MOTC agreed with 
the international consultants' pro-privatisation recommendations and 
incorporated them into the final draft of the Telecommunications Master 
Plan (TMP) approved by the Cabinet in 1995. This document envisaged a 
future of fully privatised telecommunications SOEs and a 
telecommunications sector characterised by competition between both 
domestic and international private sector companies. Not all were 
convinced. A survey of TOT workers at the time revealed considerable 
doubts as well as a lack of understanding about privatisation. These 
sentiments were echoed by the Thai middle class, labour unions and the 
media; they were all suspicious of whose interests were being best served by 
privatisation (Chulajata 2006). Meanwhile, a new government under 
Barnharn Silpa-Archa required the resubmission of the TMP and once again 
appointed the familiar cast of international consultants (and one domestic 
firm) to review, amend and clarify proposed privatisation strategies. Four 
ministries consulted by the TOT gave their unanimous support for 
liberalisation of the telecommunications sector and the privatisation of the 
TOT. They noted the need for timely action so that the TOT would not be 
disadvantaged in Thailand's growing and diversifying telecommunications 
market. This consideration was evident in the revised TMP which was 
approved by cabinet in November 1996. A rosy future of strategic alliances, 
capital inflow, reduced bureaucratic red-tape and expanding business was 
anticipated by the TOT's leadership. 
These optimistic visions were rudely interrupted by the Asian 
Financial Crisis of 1997, which affected Thailand severely. The exchange 
rate of the Baht tumbled, economic growth went into reverse, many jobs 
were lost, families dropped below the poverty line, property prices plunged, 
investment capital dried up and financial institutions shut down or struggled 
to survive. The IMF stepped in to provide the government with urgently 
needed funds, but these financial injections came with conditions imposed 
by the IMF, one of them being a demonstrated commitment to privatisation. 
This condition was spelled out repeatedly in a series of 'letters of intent' sent 
by the Thai government to the IMF between 1997 and 1999. They assured 
the IMF of Thailand's intention to implement privatisation in key sectors. 
The establishment of an Office of State Enterprise, the release of a 
Privatisation Master Plan in 1998 and the identification of fast-track 
privatisation candidates, including the TOT, were furnished as evidence of 
the government's commitment to privatisation. The Secretary of the NESDB 
reaffirmed the importance of privatisation for the future competitiveness of 
the Thai economy (Wongcha-um 2000). 
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The coercive mode of privatisation policy transfer employed by the 
IMF was given further impetus by two other factors. Firstly, conditions 
attached to Thailand's membership in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
required the liberalisation of telecommunications services by 2006 
(Thanapachai & Plengmaneepum 1997). State domination through its giant 
SOEs was no longer acceptable. The TOT had to be privatised. Secondly, a 
new Thai Constitution introduced in October 1997 contained three clauses 
stipulating that broadcasting and telecommunications could no longer be 
monopolised by the state. While these events appeared to have made 
telecommunications privatisation a fait accompli, there was growing 
acknowledgment that, there were considerable legislative and administrative 
obstacles to overcome. 
 In 2002, the TOT commenced the staged path to privatisation by 
being converted to 'The TOT Corporation Public Company Limited' with an 
initial capitalisation of 600 million shares at 10 Baht each. However, the 
sole shareholder was the Ministry of Finance (MOF). Although the new 
TOT remained technically an SOEs, it was exempt from the rules, 
regulations and cabinet resolutions that normally governed all SOEs in order 
to prepare it for full privatisation. New subsidiaries were formed, and joint 
ventures with private sector firms were initiated; these new relationships 
involved enterprises concerning mobile phones, submarine optical fibre 
cables, the Internet, online airline seating, plastic chip cards, telephone 
directories and information services. This move was portrayed as part of the 
privatisation plan to convert a bureaucratic entity into a flexible modern 
business organisation, the 'Best of the Best' (TOT 2002). Restructuring 
commenced in line with the concept of 'decentralized operation, centralized 
control', service-mindedness, customer focus and entrepreneurship were to 
become characteristics of the organisation, and the balanced scorecard was 
introduced to improve employee performance (TOT 2003, 2004). These 
activities clearly signalled that the TOT Corporation Public Company was 
preparing for full privatisation by shaking off its bureaucratic past and 
introducing the management methods and jargon of the private sector. 
 Despite embracing the fashions of modern private sector management 
to demonstrate its fitness for entry to the ranks of major private 
corporations, the TOT still had to grapple with the issue of operating 
concessions granted to a range of private sector operators, which was 
described as an 'odd set-up' in The Economist (2006). What was to happen 
to these agreements covering periods ranging from 15 to 27 years? How 
could these concessions be converted into licences? This matter received 
much attention and generated considerable debate. It also entailed several 
consultancy reports but remained stubbornly unresolved (Prateepchaikul 
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2001, 2002; Tortermvasana & Prateepchaikul 2003). It even precipitated the 
creation of the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) in 2004 to 
provide policy guidance in telecommunications. But the NTC was unable to 
formulate concession conversion proposals acceptable to all parties. And 
there was still the need for a substantial and complex legislative program to 
facilitate the full privatisation of the TOT. 
 While telecommunications privatisation was still the declared policy 
objective of the Thai government, its implementation increasingly 
encountered obstacles. The government slowed the progress of 
telecommunications privatisation while both allowing and encouraging 
political opposition to privatisation from unions, nationalists, and others. 
But it was a political bombshell that exploded in 2005 that took the ground 
out from under the supporters of telecommunications privatisation. This 
catastrophic development was the sale of telecommunications giant Shin 
Corporation to Temasek Holdings, the Singapore government's investment 
company, for USD1.85 billion. Shin Corporation was owned by the family 
of Thai Prime Minister Thaksin (Bowornwathana 2005). This galvanised 
and boosted the Thaksin administration's opposition, which viewed this 
development as proof of using a government position for personal financial 
gain. The sale of Shin Corporation to Temasek Holdings also lent support to 
the idea that national security would be threatened by the sale of strategic 
Thai assets to foreign interests. Privatisation thus became associated with 
corruption, the self-interest of elites and the loss of national patrimony. The 
situation was compounded by the March 2006 judgment of the Supreme 
Administrative Court to accept the TOT employees' appeal 'to revoke the 
plan and change its status back to a state enterprise' (Telecom Asia Daily 





All of the theories that deal with the movement of policies from one place to 
another pay inadequate attention to what happens to those policies when 
they arrive on foreign shores. The example of the TOT shows that a great 
deal happens. Unique structural features of the recipient societies, events in 
the local arena, and the interplay of domestic and international actors in 
policy networks lead to the modification, perhaps repeatedly, of the 
imported policy. Furthermore, it must be remembered that policies in the 
countries of origin are also liable to change, and these changes are likely to 
be communicated among the actors in the policy network. Not one of the 
dominant approaches to policy movement is capable of dealing with this 
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complexity. This sort of analysis requires the use of a range of ideas drawn 
from the competing literatures of policy transfer, policy diffusion and policy 
convergence. 
 The policy transfer approach focuses on agency, or what actors do. 
The primary advice that this approach can offer is to look for the actors that 
facilitate the transfer of policies. In the case of the TOT, we can identify a 
range of actors who both facilitated policy transfer and opposed it. The Thai 
government demonstrated interest in privatisation policies from at least the 
mid-1980s, when IFIs began to promote the merits of privatisation. The 
Thai adherents to privatisation saw it as a method of increasing the 
competitiveness of Thailand in the global economy into which, it was 
perceived, the country was increasingly being integrated. Politicians and 
senior bureaucrats, especially technocrats in the NESDB and elsewhere, 
voluntarily transferred privatisation policies into Thailand with assistance 
from IFIs, including the World Bank, IMF and ADB. International 
consultancy firms also promoted and facilitated telecommunications 
privatisation through the advice provided to the Thai government. The 
domestic private sector put its weight behind telecommunications 
privatisation, especially companies that had secured or wished to secure 
lucrative concessions from the TOT. These companies built relationships 
with political parties to gain influence in political decision-making circles 
(Niyomsilpa 2000). International telecommunications companies provided 
further  support for the move towards privatisation as they saw profitable 
opportunities in the Thai telecommunications sector and inadequate 
domestic capacity to meet the anticipated demand for infrastructure and 
services in such a market. 
 The coalition of interests in favour of privatisation built its case on 
claims of the efficiency and effectiveness of the market for the production 
and distribution of goods and services. The state, they argued, was 
unsuitable for such activity and should focus on core policy areas that did 
not include telecommunications. This ideology of market superiority 
expounded by IFIs and government officials was supported by domestic and 
international capital, especially as these business interests could see exciting 
possibilities for profit in an expanding and privatised telecommunications 
industry. 
 Caution rather than organised opposition accounted for the slow rise 
of privatisation in the 1980s and early 1990s. But as the 1990s progressed, 
the strength of the pro-privatisation coalition increased. Domestic private 
sector companies had gained profitable niches in Thailand's growing and 
diversifying telecommunications sector by this stage and were better able to 
lobby and influence the political parties and government decision-makers. 
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International consultancy firms that were hired to provide advice on 
privatisation reiterated the desirability of telecommunications privatisation 
and perhaps saw future opportunities for themselves in the implementation 
of privatisation policy. 
 Sustained opposition to privatisation came from labour unions, which 
were larger, more vociferous and better organised in SOEs than in the 
private sector. Accompanying the labour unions were advocates of 
nationalism who could be found in national politics, among academics, in 
the media, in Thai society at large, and later among the representatives of 
domestic capital. As Hewison (2005: 321) has observed, under Thaksin's 
rule 'slowing the pace of privatization was meant to allow time for domestic 
interests to ready themselves for involvement'. The opposition forces 
interpreted privatisation as an assault on sovereignty, and the bigger the 
SOEs was, the greater the assault. These actors also saw SOEs as fulfilling 
the social responsibilities of government and that privatisation would be a 
dereliction of that duty, most clearly expressed in higher prices for services 
and inequity in their distribution. Labour unions feared for job security and 
erosion of their terms and conditions of employment, which were generally 
more favourable than in the public service. There were some government 
officials who were not necessarily against privatisation per se, but have 
different views on what needed to be privatised and what form it should 
take. This was perhaps an inevitable aspect of coalition government. There 
may also have been disguised opposition (or at least foot-dragging) among 
some senior bureaucrats who were suspicious of what marketisation might 
do to the traditions of state control. Certainly within SOEs, such as the TOT, 
there were senior personnel who saw their interests threatened by 
privatisation and crossed over to the opposition (Dempsey 2000). 
 The relative strengths and exact make-up of these policy transfer 
coalitions varied across time because the participants in the 
telecommunications policy network did not act in a vacuum. Rather, they 
were influenced and constrained by events and forces in the environment in 
which they operated. As such, the insights of policy diffusion and policy 
convergence literature are required to complement the policy transfer 
framework to explain the course of events in the history of 
telecommunications privatisation in Thailand. 
A major impetus for telecommunications privatisation was the 
increased demand for telecommunications services in Thailand. This 
worked in tandem with the rapid rate of innovation in telecommunications 
technology to produce a situation in which the state telecommunications 
monopoly simply could not keep up. It did not have access to the required 
resources and perceived a need to look to the private sector for assistance. 
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This was complemented by a prevailing global policy regime in favour of 
privatisation as an integral element of rolling back the public sector and 
letting the invisible hand of the market take over. Conforming to or at least 
accommodating such dominant paradigms becomes the global norm. In the 
case of Thai telecommunications, this norm was most clearly spelled out           
in the requirements of the WTO for a competitive market in 
telecommunications. The advent of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 was 
an unforeseen event that greatly increased the rate and intensity of 
privatisation policy transfer, notably in the coercive transfer of the IMF. 
This was complemented, in the same year, by the voluntary support for 
privatisation contained in the new constitution. 
 If the actors and events have been working in favour of 
telecommunications privatisation in Thailand appeared to make such an 
invincible team, then why was the privatisation of telecommunications only 
ever partial and, after 2005, in abeyance? The answer once again comes 
from combining the approaches of policy transfer and diffusion, looking at 
actors in context. Among the opposition actors whom we have identified, 
labour unions, especially those at the TOT, some senior TOT personnel, 
some academics, some media personnel, nationalist politicians, the Thai 
public, especially the middle class, and some senior Thai public servants 
may have been less than enthusiastic about privatisation.  Their opposition 
could be detected in foot-dragging, procrastination and other techniques 
designed to slow the pace of change. Domestic capitalists also joined the 
opponents of privatisation when they perceived the major threat to their 
interests posed by foreign capital. For all these actors, their degree of 
antipathy towards privatisation ebbed and flowed. In 2005, it flowed most 
strongly as privatisation policy transfer became entwined with the political 
crisis associated with the sale of the then-Prime Minister Thaksin's family 
telecommunications company, Shin Corporation. This produced an upsurge 
in nationalist sentiment opposed to the growing role of foreign companies in 
Thailand's telecommunications sector and aroused fears of price rises for 
services in the context of economic hardship. Furthermore, it aroused the 
longstanding public mistrust of the motivations of private sector actors in 
privatisation. They were seen as looking after their own interests to the 
detriment of the public good. The public, encouraged by the media, looked 
for equity in access to telecommunications services. After all, successive 
Thai governments had pledged their commitment to universal service 
access. 
 Additional factors that contributed to the stuttering progress of 
telecommunications privatisation can be found in the structure and workings 
of the state and can perhaps be interpreted as a legacy of the bureaucratic 
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polity. This same legacy of legal and bureaucratic complexity has been 
identified as a key factor in stalling recent public administration reforms 
(Painter 2004). When the state recruited private sector assistance to meet the 
increasing demand for telecommunications services, it employed an 
ingenious BTO scheme in order to circumvent the legislation that gave the 
TOT and CAT monopoly status in their areas of operation. However, 
dismantling the ingenious structures to facilitate full TOT privatisation 
proved to be far more difficult than their construction, as agreement could 
not be reached between and within state organisations, especially the TOT 
and private providers, on the terms of the concession conversions. Different 
concession conditions and the fear of losing out in the conversion process 
meant that consensus was elusive. The delayed process of TOT privatisation 
was also hampered by several changes of government. New governments 
wished to put their own particular policy stamp on legislation and hence felt 
the need to review and revise the policies of their predecessors. Finally, 
within the government, there appeared to be some who saw the TOT as a 
valuable state asset providing an excellent income stream. For example, by 
2004, the TOT had fully recovered from the Asian Financial Crisis and was 
in an expansionary mode earning a net profit of 11.5 billion Baht on 
revenues amounting to 62.1 billion Baht (Telephone Organisation of 
Thailand 2004: 7). Thus, financial justification for retaining state ownership 
could be advocated. Furthermore, it would be favourably received by a 
population comfortable with decades of a centralised state and its dominant 





The case of telecommunications privatisation in Thailand reveals that policy 
transfer is not a straightforward affair. It is likely to be the opposite, as a 
range of actors, both domestic and international, and changing contextual 
factors determine the transferability of particular policies and the                  
form that those policies actually take. In Thailand, there have been 20 years              
of importing, experimentation and declared commitment to 
telecommunications privatisation, yet it remains partial and uniquely Thai, 
sometimes standing in clear contrast to the ideas and practises found in 
transferring nations and institutions. 
 The story of telecommunications privatisation policy transfer in 
Thailand is one of complexity and is not amenable to explanation by simple 
models. However, by adopting a hybrid explanatory framework employing 
the analytical strengths of different perspectives—policy transfer, policy 
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convergence and policy diffusion—we are better able to interpret the course 
of events and identify the processes that occur when policies developed in 
one place are transported to another location. Only by adopting such multi-
level dynamic models can we begin to gain a proper understanding of what 
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